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This essay argues that neither the etiological nor the dispositional
account of functions conforms to the actual practice by which func-
tions are ascribed in biology. Philip Kitcher’s account, which unifies
what is common to both accounts, is assessed against what biolo-
gists are actually doing when they ascribe functions. Two problems
of Kitcher’s account are identified: it is too liberal and it tends to
circularity, insofar as it presupposes teleological notions. Finally, an
alternative account of functions is provided by characterizing the sys-
tem of sentences that report natural history.
1 Biological Functions
Functions are used both in order to explain what something is and why it is
doing what it does, by citing one of its effects. This sort of explanation is
unproblematic in the case of artefacts, for artefacts are intentionally designed
to do something. Functions are also attributed, however, to natural objects,
and biologists have found it difficult, even undesirable, to eliminate this form
of explanation from their discussions of biological phenomena (Allen and
Bekoff 1995, 610). Thus, we are in need of an account of natural teleology.
We have to answer the question of how it is possible to explain something by
citing its function, i.e., one of its effects.
There are two dominant positions in the debate on biological functions,
providing two different answers to this question. On the one hand, the etio-
logical account, first elaborated by Wright (1973), understands functions as
effects of objects which contributed to the presence or persistence of those
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objects. More specifically, the most prominent versions of this account un-
derstand functions as selected effects (cf. Millikan 1984; Neander 1991; Grif-
fiths 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994; Allen and Bekoff 1995). According to these
philosophers, functional explanations are unproblematic because they refer to
what was initially responsible for the existence of some object. On the other
hand, the dispositional account, first elaborated by Cummins (1975), under-
stands functions as effects which contribute to more complex dispositions
of the relevant containing system. Since function ascriptions are interest-
relative, according to this account, to explain something by reference to its
function is to refer to its causal role in producing other things that interest
us. Hence, functional explanations seem innocuous.
Although the question as to which account should be favoured was ini-
tially hotly contested, today most commentators agree that these two ac-
counts pick out two different notions of function, which should be kept apart
(cf. Godfrey-Smith 1999; Millikan 2002; McLaughlin 2001). In contrast,
Philip Kitcher argues that we are in need of a unified account of function,
for whilst both accounts seem to relate to functions as they are attributed
in biology, each of them captures only some aspect of how they are ascribed
in particular biological fields. By paying attention to the different function
ascription practices in biology, Kitcher wants to provide a unified account of
functions.
I am sympathetic to Kitcher’s sensitivity to the actual practices of ascrib-
ing functions in biology. It seems to me that the debate would substantially
profit from similar endeavours to analyze what biologists are actually doing
when they are ascribing functions to the structures and behaviours of or-
ganisms. Therefore, I wish to assess Kitcher’s unified account and discuss
an alternative account which follows him in paying attention to biological
practice.
I start by establishing the need for a unified account. I do so by consid-
ering different ways of reacting to the fact that there are these two concep-
tions of function. As will be shown, there are only two options available for
someone who takes the different biological practices of ascribing functions
seriously: one has to provide either an account that unifies what is common
to those two conceptions of function, or an alternative account which does
not reduce teleological to non-teleological vocabulary. I present Kitcher’s
account as the most promising version of a unified reductionist account in
section 3, and discuss two possible problems for his account in section 4.
Finally, I sketch an alternative account of biological function.
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2 Two Conceptions of Function
There are two conceptions of biological function acknowledged in the current
debate: the etiological and the dispositional accounts. According to the most
prominent version of the former, some item X has the function of doing F if
it has been selected for doing F. According to the latter, functions are effects
that contribute to more complex dispositions of a containing system.
Proponents of the etiological account of biological functions think that
their account has the following merits: (α) it accounts for the distinction
between a trait’s proper function and its merely accidental effects, (β) it
accounts for the possibility of a trait malfunctioning, and (γ) it maintains a
realist view in respect of functions.
However, there are some well-known issues with this account: (χ) since
the first occurrence of a trait has not been selected for, the initial effect of
that trait which has led to the recurrence of a similar trait in the descendant
organisms cannot be the function of the original trait, (ψ) this account can-
not differentiate between functions and vestiges, and (ω) according to this
account, but contrary to our practice, we would have to ascribe functions to
whole organisms (McLaughlin 2001, 99).
The dispositional account’s merits and disadvantages mirror the etiologi-
cal account’s disadvantages and merits: it is not committed to (χ), (ψ), and
(ω), but cannot account for (α), (β), and (γ). This account is not committed
to the counter-intuitive claim that an ancestor’s behaviour does not have a
function, although it behaves in exactly the same way as its descendants do.
Neither does it imply that useless traits, which were once selected, should
be considered as having a function. Nor does it entail that we should as-
cribe a function to whole organisms. It, therefore, accords with ordinary use.
Yet the dispositional account cannot distinguish between a trait’s proper be-
haviour and its accidental effects. Neither can it account for a biological
trait’s malfunctioning. Since this account cannot maintain a realist position
with regard to function, functions seem to be imposed on nature by us.
How are we to react to there being those two conceptions of function in
light of their problems? There are four options available:
1. Claim that one of the two accounts is right (and reformulate it in order
to avoid its problems).1
1 Recently two accounts have been developed that try to improve the etiological and dis-
positional account, respectively, by appeal to “self-reproduction”. According to McLaugh-
lin’s version of the etiological account (2001), something has a function if it contributed
to its own maintenance over time. According to Weber’s version of the dispositional ac-
count (2005), a capacity is a function if it is part of a coherent system of capacities. A
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2. Claim that these two accounts should be kept apart because they serve
different purposes.
3. Provide a unified reductionist account.
4. Develop an alternative account of biological functions according to
which functions are not be analysed in non-teleological vocabulary.
Which options are available to a philosopher who takes current biological
practices of ascribing functions seriously?
We have to rebut option (1) if we consider the practices in e.g., both be-
havioral ecology and developmental biology, given that function ascriptions
in such fields as developmental biology often appear to make no reference
to evolution or selection, whereas function ascriptions in such fields as be-
havioral ecology do not depend on the contribution of a behavior to a more
complex disposition.
What about option (2)? Godfrey-Smith (1999), for example, argues for
this position. He claims that etiological and dispositional accounts relate
two different concepts and that there is no strong reason for using the same
word for both kinds of function. We have to rebut this option, however,
if we consider an account based on that proposal as being an explanation
of how functions are attributed in biology. For, irrespective of the particu-
lar field, function attributions in biology do not seem to be interest-relative
(cf. Weber 2005, 191). Thus, the dispositional account, which claims that
function ascriptions depend on the investigator’s interest, cannot cover the
function-attribution practice of any of the fields in biology. Since the etio-
logical account does not cover all fields, the practice of ascribing functions
in some fields would still be unexplained if we accepted a pluralistic view of
functions.
What then of options (3) and (4)? Option (4) aims to account for func-
tions without trying to reduce teleological to non-teleological vocabulary. It
is not obvious whether such an account would conflict with the different prac-
tices of function ascription in the different areas of biology — although one
might suspect it might. In any event, such an account would not be very
fashionable since there seems to be a general agreement among commentators
that a reductive program is the only way to treat functions. I shall therefore
postpone the discussion of this option to section 5, in which I explicate such
an account, and consider, now, option (3).
system of capacities is coherent if each capacity contributes to another capacity. Such a
system of capacities explains how an organism can self-reproduce. Both accounts have
problems, however, ascribing functions to reproductive organs, as reproductive organs do
not contribute to the self-reproduction of an organism.
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If a unified account of functions could be provided, it would both be
sensitive to the pluralistic practice of ascribing functions in biology and be
able to account for what is common to these different ascriptions. On the
assumption that pluralism is untenable, it is the only reductive account avail-
able to the philosopher who takes seriously the current practices of function
ascriptions in the different areas of biology.
Having established the need for a unified account of function, I now want
to present and discuss Kitcher’s version of such an account.
3 Kitcher’s Unified Account of Function
In “Function and Design”, Kitcher proposes a unified account of function
that is general not only insofar as it pays attention to the pluralistic function-
attribution practice in biology, but also in virtue of it covering functions of
both artefacts and organisms.
According to Kitcher, the key notion for understanding the concept of a
function is design. Artefacts have functions because they are intentionally
designed to do something. For instance, the function of a microwave oven
is to heat meals because that is what it is designed to do. Likewise, there
is a direct link between the functions of organisms and their design. Pre-
Darwinian accounts of function presupposed divine intentions in order to
explain the design of organisms. According to post-Darwinian accounts,
however, “we can think of design without a designer” (Kitcher 2003, 160).
The source of natural design lies in the action of natural selection: what a
given organ is designed to do is that for which it was selected.
Up to this point, Kitcher’s account seems to correspond to the etiological
account. What the functions of artefacts and of organisms have in common
is that they both depend on design. Nonetheless, according to Kitcher, this
dependence can be more or less direct. So, for example, it is possible that a
person who is making a machine forgets to fit a certain component that plays
a crucial part in the machine’s proper functioning. If something accidentally
becomes lodged in the right position, however, and fulfils the job of the
forgotten component, then we can ascribe a function to it even though that
thing is not intentionally designed to do what it is now doing. Equally, a
biological trait may respond to a selection pressure, and thus be attributed a
function, even though it is not designed to do what it does because it was not
selected for doing that. In such cases, functions are attributed to entities that
are not designed to do something, but rather stand in an indirect relation
to design: they fulfil tasks that are imposed on them by the design of the
whole.
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Now, one could worry that the unity arising from the notion of design
might reveal itself as rather superficial, insofar as one could argue that we
attribute two different conceptions of design to artefacts and to organisms.
We would also need a unified account of design. Thus, it seems as if this
notion cannot cover the different ascriptions of functions.
Yet, notwithstanding the mentioning of ‘design’ in the title of his paper,
on a more careful reading of “Function and Design”, it seems to me that
this notion does not play such a crucial part in Kitcher’s account of function.
More recently, Kitcher (2011) claims that the notion of a problem background
is what really constitutes the unity in the concept of function: something
has a function if it stands in a context involving a problem background and
responds as a solution to those problems. In the case of artefactual functions,
the inventor of an artefact faces a problem, and the wish to solve it serves
as the basis of the artefact’s function. In the biological case, the problems
are generated by selection pressures arising from the interaction between the
organism’s constitution and its environment.
The notion of a problem background unites the two conceptions of bi-
ological function. For, on the one hand, an organism only has a problem
background if it faces selection pressures, whilst on the other, biologists in
certain areas attribute functions without knowing the exact evolutionary his-
tory of a trait of an organism. Instead, they rely on the problem background
for the organism in question in order to pick out the contributions its traits
make to solving some problem.
In summary, Kitcher’s unified account of function captures the intuitions
behind both conceptions. As per the etiological account, this account empha-
sises the role of natural selection for ascribing functions, insofar as a problem
background is constituted only by selection pressures. Akin to the disposi-
tional account, this account does not demand that a trait’s contribution to
survival or reproduction be one that has been naturally selected for, in order
to be reckoned as its function; rather, the contribution has to be seen as
responding to the organism’s problem background.
4 Two Problems for Kitcher’s Account
In section 2, I considered how one might react to there being two conceptions
discussed in the current debate on biological function. I excluded two ways of
reacting: claiming that only one account is right, and claiming that the two
conceptions should be kept apart because they serve two different purposes.
After presenting Kitcher’s unified account, I would now like to ask whether
this account is really available to the philosopher who takes the biological
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practices of ascribing functions seriously, and whether this account really
explains what it is supposed to explain. I shall present two reasons why both
questions might be answered in the negative.
Concerning the first question, Kitcher’s account may well fail to conform
to the biological practice of ascribing functions, insofar as his account might
be considered too liberal. As with the dispositional account, this account
makes every contribution of a trait to the survival or reproduction of the
organism look to be its function, even if the contribution happens acciden-
tally. I am not sure, though, whether biologists do indeed recognise such
contributions as functions.
Here is an example of such an accidental contribution. This example is
the closest analog to Kitcher’s own example of an indirect artefactual func-
tion. As stated earlier, it is Kitcher’s view that we can attribute a function to
an artefact’s forgotten component which accidentally becomes lodged in the
right position and, thus, fulfils a job. Similarly, even the accidental contribu-
tion of a trait to the survival of the organism can, according to his account,
be recognised as its function. However, in the case of biological function, we
would have to attribute a function even to a disease were it to contribute
to the overall fitness of the organism. Indeed, diseases need not have uni-
formly negative effects on the fitness of organisms. As Jarosz and Davelos
(2006) indicate, fungal endophytes of the genus Myriogenospora reduce both
the growth and reproduction of plants but also provide protection from her-
bivores. Thus, grasses infected with fungal endophytes of this genus have
slightly increased fitness relative to uninfected plants under high herbivore
pressures. Yet, although phytologists notice the positive effects certain fun-
gal endophytes have on their hosts, they do not seem to consider them as
functions for these hosts — as they ought, according to Kitcher’s account.2
Concerning the second question, as to whether or not this account ex-
plains what it is supposed to explain, I would like to suggest that Kitcher’s
account is circular insofar as it presupposes teleological notions. The notion
of a problem background seems to have application only for things that aim
at being in certain conditions. Thus we can attribute this notion only if we
already understand that to which it applies as something that should be a
certain way. But to understand something in this way is to understand it as
having a telos — yet that is exactly what Kitcher’s account of function is
supposed to provide.
2 To be sure, under certain conditions, allowing some fungi to thrive on the plant could
be a function. The infection of a plant with some fungal endophytes would only count as
something the plant allows, however, if we could distinguish cases when the plant fights
the infection from those when it remains passive. Yet, the cases Jarosz and Davelos (2006)
report do not leave room for such a distinction.
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Let me illustrate my claims with a quotation from Kitcher’s “Function
and Design”. He writes:
Holding the principal features of the environment fixed, we can
ask what selective pressures are imposed on members of a group of
organisms. In posing such questions we suppose that some of the
general properties of the organisms do not vary and consider the
obstacles that must be overcome if organisms with those general
properties are to survive and reproduce in environments of the
type that interests us. (2003, 161, my emphasis)
We ascribe functions by identifying contributions to the overcoming of ob-
stacles and we identify obstacles by considering what it is that organisms of
a certain constitution, in a certain environment, have to overcome if they are
to survive and reproduce. Now, how are we to understand the if-clause of the
last sentence? We can understand it either as simply hypothetical thinking
or as what those organisms are supposed to do. I suggest that only if we
understand it in the latter sense, can we identify the need to survive and
to reproduce as that which constitutes real pressures imposed on organisms.
Since those needs can only constitute real pressures for organisms if they are
supposed to obtain, organisms are supposed to have those needs. To say
that organisms need to reproduce, to survive long enough, and to be fertile,
is, however, to say that organisms should do certain things. Yet an account
of biological function is supposed to explain how we are to understand that
organisms should do certain things. In this respect, Kitcher’s account shows
a certain degree of circularity.
5 An Alternative Account of Function
What might an alternative account of biological function look like? I would
now like to sketch such an account. In contrast to the three accounts dis-
cussed so far, an alternative account of biological function need not consist in
a reduction of teleological to non-teleological vocabulary. Instead, the con-
cept of a biological function can be shown to relate to a form of description
of events. This concept is then elucidated by showing how such a particular
form of description differs from other forms of description.
Let me explain. The debate about how to understand biological functions
is dominated by the view that to explain the concept of a function is to say
something about the content of a function-ascribing sentence. According
to the standard view, an analysis of the concept of a function consists in
specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be reckoned as
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falling under this concept. In contrast, the alternative project here proposed
is to characterize a system of sentences to which a sentence joining an item
x and a predicate F belongs, if it is true that x has the function of doing
F. Therefore, this alternative account proceeds by analysing a system of
sentences which do not contain explicit ascriptions of function.
I now look at cases of implicit function-ascriptions in order to show how
such an alternative account might explain the concept of a biological func-
tion. The example I discuss is from the same paper Kitcher uses in order to
illustrate his own account. The following account reports the natural history
of spiders of the species Nephila clavipes :
Spiderlings overwinter in the egg sac for six to eight months,
emerging under favourable conditions in March. [. . . . After two
or three weeks] spiderlings [. . . ] build and inhabit individual orbs
on which prey are captured. In early July, males begin to mature
adulthood and abandon their orbs in search of females. Males
compete for a position proximal to the female, near the hub of
the web. [. . . ] Copulations occur primarily during the two-day
period immediately following the female’s final moult [. . . ]. Dur-
ing the next few months females lay up to three egg clutches, each
containing several hundred eggs. [. . . ] Second instars, capable of
silk production, overwinter within the egg sac without the benefit
of the mother’s protection. (Christenson and Wenzl 1980, 1110)
What functions are implicitly attributed in this account? Let me make ex-
plicit some of the functions to be found. The egg sac has the function of
protecting the spiderlings in overwintering. The building and inhabiting of
orbs has the function of capturing prey. The males’ abandoning of their orbs
has the function of finding females to mate. The males’ competing behaviour
has the function of copulating with a female, and copulation, obviously, has
the function of reproduction.
Now, how did I identify these different functions? Two principles seem
to be at work in identifying them. The first principle is that whenever this
account reports that spiders do F in, on or with some item x, then doing F is
the function of x. Ascribing a function to the egg sac, for instance, accords
with this principle. The second principle seems to be that contributing to the
behaviour mentioned in a subsequent sentence is the function of the behaviour
mentioned in a previous sentence. Ascribing the function of copulating to
the competing behaviour of males, for instance, accords with this principle.
Thus, the sentences reporting this natural history correspond to one of two
schemata: they have either the form ‘The S does F in, on or with x ’ or
‘First, the S does F, and then it does G’. Functions that are expressed in
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sentences corresponding to the first schema are attributed to structures or
organs. Functions of the second kind, on the other hand, are attributed to
behaviour. Yet, functions of the latter kind are prior to functions of the
former kind, since instances of the first schema are embedded in the second
schema and, therefore, depend on there being functions of the latter kind.
As the second schema orders its sentences, these sentences form a system.
The system in question is temporally ordered, such that each sentence within
this system reports what members of this species do at a certain stage in their
lives. As can be seen in the example, such a system starts and ends with a
sentence reporting the behaviour of a new generation. Thus, the system is
characterizable as a cyclical system: what is reported in this system happens
again and again in the same order. However, the sentences that are part
of this system do not only relate to each other in virtue of depicting what
happens earlier or later; they depend on each other, insofar as each sentence
is only intelligible and thus true as part of the whole system.
Consider a cyclical system for which this is not true, for instance, the
Carbon-Nitrogen-Oxygen cycle (the CNO-cycle), which is the dominant source
of energy in stars more massive than the sun. Although the sentences describ-
ing the CNO-cycle form a cyclical system, these sentences do not presuppose
the system in order to be intelligible. So, for example, a sentence describ-
ing the transformation from nitrogen to oxygen (147 N +
1
1 H → 158 O + γ) is
intelligible and true independently of the cycle. In contrast, we could not
understand a sentence such as “Copulations occur primarily during the two-
day period immediately following the female’s final moult”, were there not
a system in the background reporting the natural history of the species in
question. For the reference to moult and reproduction would be void.
In summary, the sentences reporting the natural history of a species form
a cyclical system on which their intelligibility and truth depend. We can
therefore characterize such a cyclical system as a holistic system.3
After characterizing the system of sentences reporting the natural history
of a species, I am now in a position to give an account of biological function.
If the observation is correct that biologists, in expanding our knowledge, aim
at contributing true sentences to cyclical and holistic systems, then to ascribe
a particular function to a structure or behaviour is to claim that any sentence
joining the structure or behaviour with a subject belongs to such a system.
In other words, the question whether something has a function asks whether
3 According to Weber (2005), functions are capacities that form a coherent system.
He characterizes such a system as both cyclical and holistic. Whereas I describe a system
of sentences, he holds that it is the capacities themselves which constitute such a system.
Therefore, his account—unlike my own—seems to have problems ascribing functions to
reproductive organs.
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a sentence mentioning this structure or behaviour is part of a cyclical and
holistic system of sentences. To ask what function a structure or behaviour
has is to ask for the position of the relevant sentence within such a system.
6 Conclusion
The account of biological function presented in this paper differs from stan-
dard accounts in several respects. First, it does not attempt to reduce tele-
ological to non-teleological vocabulary, as it has not been established that
teleological explanations are more complex mechanical explanations. Sec-
ond and relatedly, this account does not specify the necessary and sufficient
conditions for something to fall under the concept of a function. Instead, I
have offered an account of biological functions by reflecting on how biologi-
cal facts are represented. Sentences reporting biological phenomena form a
special kind of system. Such a system of sentences is special in being both
cyclical and holistic. In order to give a full account of biological functions,
one would have to say more to characterize the system of sentences in ques-
tion.4 However, if my considerations are right, then ascribing a function to a
structure or behaviour is claiming that a sentence which joins this structure
or behaviour with its subject is part of such a system.5
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